Abstract-A clinical decision support system forms a critical capability to link health observations with health knowledge to influence choices by clinicians for improved healthcare. Recent trends toward remote outsourcing can be exploited to provide efficient and accurate clinical decision support in healthcare. In this scenario, clinicians can use the health knowledge located in remote servers via the Internet to diagnose their patients. However, the fact that these servers are third party and therefore potentially not fully trusted raises possible privacy concerns. In this paper, we propose a novel privacy-preserving protocol for a clinical decision support system where the patients' data always remain in an encrypted form during the diagnosis process. Hence, the server involved in the diagnosis process is not able to learn any extra knowledge about the patient's data and results. Our experimental results on popular medical datasets from UCI-database demonstrate that the accuracy of the proposed protocol is up to 97.21% and the privacy of patient data is not compromised.
Privacy-Preserving Clinical Decision Support System
Using Gaussian Kernel-Based Classification
The recent advances in remote outsourcing techniques (i.e., cloud computing) can be exploited in healthcare to provide efficient and accurate decision support as a service. This service could be utilized by any clinician in a flexible manner such as on-demand or pay-per use [6] . Within this context, let us consider the following scenario: a third party server builds a clinical decision support system using the existing clinical dataset (i.e., assume that the server has a rich clinical dataset for a particular disease). Now clinicians, who want to verify whether their patients are affected by that particular disease, could send the patient data to the server via the Internet to perform diagnosis based on the healthcare knowledge at the server. This new notion overcomes the difficulties that would be faced by the clinicians, such as having to collect a large number of samples (i.e., a rich clinical dataset), and requiring high computational and storage resources to build their own decision support system. However, there is now a risk that the third party servers are potentially untrusted servers. Hence, releasing the patient data samples owned by the clinician or revealing the decision to the untrusted server raises privacy concerns. This drawback can affect the adoption of outsourcing techniques in healthcare [7] , [8] . Furthermore, the server may not wish to disclose the features of the clinical decision support system even if it offers the service to the clinicians. Hence, in this paper we propose a privacypreserving clinical decision support system which preserves the privacy of the patient data, the decision and the server side clinical decision support system parameters, so that the benefits of the emerging outsourcing technology can also be enjoyed in the healthcare sector.
In particular, we consider a decision support system that was developed using a support vector machine (SVM), which is one of the machine learning tools which has been widely used to predict various diseases in biomedical engineering [9] - [11] . Typically, using an SVM consists of two different phases, namely training and testing. During the training phase, a classifier will be trained using features of the training dataset belonging to different classes. In the testing phase, any unlabeled data sample can be classified and labeled to the corresponding matched class using the trained classifier. In the current setting, the available clinical dataset can be used to train a classifier and the trained classifier can be used as a clinical decision support system during the testing phase to make the decision for the patient data.
Depending on the separability of the available training data, the SVM uses particular kernel functions such as linear and nonlinear kernels. If the number of features is larger than the number of instances, it is not necessary to map the data into higher dimensional space [12] . It is because nonlinear mapping does not improve the performance. Since medical datasets, in general, have less number of features than the number of instances, it is possible to get better classification results with nonlinear kernel-based SVM. Polynomial and Gaussian kernels are nonlinear kernels. The polynomial kernel-based model is parametric, while the Gaussian kernel-based model is nonparametric. In a way, a nonparametric model means that the complexity of the model is infinite, its complexity grows with number of instances. In contrast a parametric model's size is fixed, so after a certain point, the model become saturated, and giving more and more instances will not help. It means that the accuracy is dependent on the chosen degree of the polynomial. However, the Gaussian kernel finds the best polynomial function in the infinite dimension for the given dataset. Hence, we consider the Gaussian kernel-based classification in this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, we present the first known privacy-preserving clinical decision support system for a Gaussian kernel-based SVM. In order to preserve privacy, we redesign the conventional Gaussian kernel-based SVM algorithm as an encrypted-domain algorithm using the Paillier homomorphic encryption technique as one of its building blocks [14] . Since the Paillier encryption supports only integers and the system variables are continuous and the Gaussian kernel involves exponentiation of negative values, crucially we develop a novel technique to scale the variables, which overcomes these barriers without deteriorating the privacy and performance.
In the system, as shown in Fig. 1 , a clinician sends the patient data sample in the encrypted format to the server over the Internet. Then, the server exploits the Paillier homomorphic encryption properties to perform the operations directly on the encrypted data, or if there are any operations that cannot be handled by homomorphic properties, then there will be a limited amount of interaction between the clinician and the server based on two-party secure computation protocols [15] . We assume that both the parties will execute the protocol correctly to maintain their reputation; hence, we assume that they will behave in a semihonest manner, i.e., they are honest but curious, so privacy is a real issue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we describe the conventional SVM, i.e., the steps involved in training the SVM and classification in the plaindomain. Particular focus is placed on the Gaussian kernel method. In Section III, we first briefly describe one of the building blocks, i.e., the homomorphic encryption, and show how the SVM classification can be extended to work in the encrypted domain. Hence, the patient data can remain encrypted even when it is being processed by the server. In particular, the novel technique for scaling variables without deteriorating the performance and privacy is described in Section III-B. We analyze the performance of this encrypted-domain method in Section IV. We review related works in Section V. Conclusions are discussed in Section VI.
Notation: We use boldface upper and lower case letters for matrices and vectors, respectively; (.) denotes the transpose operator; . 2 
II. SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE
SVMs have been widely used in machine learning for data classification [16] , [17] . They have a high generalization ability which provides high reliability in real-world applications such as image processing, computer vision, text mining, natural language processing, biomedical engineering, and many more [18] - [21] . The goal of an SVM is to separate classes by a classification function, which is obtained by training with the data samples. We describe the classification function of an SVM in the following section. This classification function is crucial to derive the privacy-preserving decision support system proposed in Section III.
A. In-Plain Domain
We start with a training set of samplesx i ∈ R n , i = 1, . . . , N where each samplex i belongs to one of the two classes denoted by a label y i ∈ {−1, +1}, i = 1, . . . , N. Using these training data samples we can train an SVM to classify an unlabeled test sample. Before training an SVM, the training data needs to be normalized. Normalization keeps the numeric values of training samples on the same scale and prevents samples with a large original scale from biasing the solution. Let us denote the normalized training data samples as x i ∈ R n , i = 1, . . . , N where,
wherex and σ denote the mean and standard deviation of the training data samples, respectively. Depending on the separability of the training data, this problem is further divided into either a linear classification problem or a nonlinear classification problem.
1) Linear Classification Problem:
The goal of linear classification is to obtain two parallel hyperplanes as shown in Fig. 2 , w x + b = −1 and w x + b = +1, where w and b are classification parameters obtained during the training process. Both hyperplanes separate the training data of the two classes such that the distance between those hyperplanes is maximized.
After the training stage we can classify an unlabeled test sample,t ∈ R n . Before the classification, the test sample is normalized similar to (1) as Now, the normalized test sample t can be substituted into the following classification function:
where 
where w x + b = 0 denotes the decision hyperplane which lies between the two hyperplanes (i.e., w x + b = −1 and w x + b = +1) 2) Nonlinear Classification Problem: In the previous section, we discussed the classification problem where the training data samples were linearly separable. However, it has been proven in the literature that a similar approach can be used for a nonlinear classification problem using kernel methods [23] . Hence, the nonlinear classification algorithm is formally similar to the linear classification algorithms except that the dot product between the data samples (i.e., x i x j ) is replaced by various nonlinear kernel functions. These kernel functions transform the nonlinear classification problem into a linear classification problem by mapping data samples into a higher dimensional feature space (see Fig. 3 ). In this study, we consider only a Gaussian function as kernel, where the dot product between the data samples x s and t in (3) and (4) can be replaced as
where γ > 0. Hence, the classification function in (3) can be modified as Without encryption the server would use (6) to make a decision on the basis of the patient data. We propose a new technique to reformulate (6) , in the next section, which will preserve the privacy of patient data, decision, and server side parameters without compromising the classification performance.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
In this section, we develop an algorithm which utilizes the healthcare knowledge available in the remote location via the Internet while preserving privacy. Hence, we consider a clientserver scenario where the remote server uses (6) as a decision making tool. As shown in Fig. 1 , a clinician sends the patient data t over the Internet and obtains support from the server to make a decision. However, the clinician is reluctant to reveal the patient data or the decision to the server due to privacy concerns. At the same time the server desires not to leak any parameter values of the classification function as this would be a breach of privacy of the training clinical data samples which relate to other patients. In this section, we show how to preserve the privacy of the patient data t and the decision from the server and the server side parameters from the clinician. First, let us explain the required building blocks in the next section.
A. Homomorphic Encryption
One of the building blocks of our technique is homomorphic encryption. For concreteness and without loss of generality, our descriptions are based on the Paillier cryptosystem [14] although any other homomorphic encryption schemes could be used. The Paillier cryptosystem is an additively homomorphic public-key encryption scheme, whose provable semantic security is based on the decisional composite residuosity problem: it is mathematically intractable to decide whether an integer z is an n-residue modulo n 2 for some composite n, i.e., whether there exists some y ∈ Z * n 2 such that z = y n mod n 2 . Let n = pq, where p and q are two large prime numbers. A message m ∈ Z n can be encrypted using the be computed efficiently in the encrypted domain as
In the setting considered in this paper, the clinician distributes a public key to the server while keeping his private key secret. The server is able to perform encryptions under this public key and exploits the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem to perform the required linear operations in the encrypted domain. However, only the clinician is able to decrypt any encrypted messages using his corresponding private key.
B. Decision Support Function in the Encrypted Domain
In (6), the server knows α s , y s , γ, x s , s ∈ S, and b in the plain domain (refer to Table I for the other variables). The clinician encrypts each element of the patient data using the public key and sends the encrypted data and the corresponding public key to the server. Note, that because the encryption is performed with the clinician's public key, no one including the server could decrypt this to obtain the values of the elements; thus, the patient data are protected against being revealed even to the server taking part in this process. Since the server only has the encrypted patient data, it has to compute (6) in the encrypted domain using homomorphic and two-party secure computation properties.
Generally, the variables associated with (6) are continuous data. Since the Paillier cryptosystem only supports integers, all the variables in (6) will be quantized to the nearest integer value during the computation in the encrypted domain, which will potentially lead to the deterioration of performance [24] , [25] . Hence, it is crucial to reformulate (6) into a form which is suitable for encrypted domain operations. To address this issue, we propose a novel technique for scaling each variable in (6) by a positive large number. More specifically, let us multiply the decision function in (6) by c 2 e c 3 > 0 as
where c 2 , c 3 ∈ R + ; hence, the solutions of (6) and (8) 
and we define
so that (11) and (8) can be replaced as
and
Note that, c 2 e c 3 −c 5 , s −c 6 , s , c 5,s , and c 2 e c 3 have, respectively, been used to scale the variables associated in (12)- (14) . Variable c 6,s in (13) has been used to mask the value −γt t + 2γx s t. We generate fresh random values of c 6,s in the range of x s x s for different s values. This masking can be used to preserve the privacy of variables computed by the server. We explain this in detail later in this section. All the variables associated in this section are given in Table I for convenience. Now, the server needs to compute (15) followed by (16) to complete the decision-making process. The server knows all the variables associated with (12) and (14) in the plain domain; hence, it can easily compute (12) and (14) without interacting with the clinician. In order to obtain the whole decision function in (15) , the server also needs to compute (13) . Since the patient data, t in (13) , are available to the server only in the encrypted domain, the server cannot directly compute (13) in the plain domain. To proceed, the server needs to normalize the patient data, then compute c 5,s + c 6,s − γt t + 2γx s t and finally the exponentiation. Let us explain each step in the following sections.
1) Normalizing the Test Sample: Before computing (13), the server needs to normalize the patient data as in (2) . Denote the patient data at the clinician ast = [t 1 , . . . ,t n ] . The clinician scales each element oft by c 1 > 0 to avoid quantization ] and the corresponding public key to the server (see Fig. 4 ). Now, the server will obtain the scaled and normalized patient data in the encrypted domain using (2) and homomorphic properties as
Let us define a mean vectorx = [x 1 , . . . ,x n ] and normalized patient data as t = [t 1 , . . . , t n ] . Hence, each element of (17) is given by
Since the server knows the vectorx, and scalars c 1 (assuming both the server and clinician know c 1 ) and σ in the plain domain, the server can easily compute the values − 
Hence, the scaled and normalized value of the patient data in (18) can be obtained in the encrypted domain as follows:
∀i.
(19) Note that every computation in (19) can be performed by the server without interacting with the clinician. Now, the server can use the encrypted, normalized, and scaled patient data
to compute (13) .
2) Computing (c 5,s + c 6,s − γt t + 2γx s t) in (13) : To do this, let us raise the power of (13) by c 
In (21) 
The 
After obtaining all the terms, the server can compute the whole term c )(c 1 t) (c 1 t) to obtain (21) . Since (25) is in the encrypted domain, the server cannot do the exponentiation as in (21) and thus will interact with the clinician to complete this exponentiation. The server sends (25) to the clinician, who decrypts and obtains c )(c 1 t) (c 1 t) . Then, the clinician divides the decrypted component by c 3 1 and obtains c 5,s + c 6,s + (2γx s ) (t) − (γ)(t) (t). It is worth noting that the values c 5,s and c 6,s have been used as a scaling factor and masking factor, respectively, to protect (2γx s ) (t) − (γ)(t) (t). Note that c 5,s + c 6,s < c 3 and the range of c 6,s must be the same as the range of x i x j , ∀i, j. Since the range c 6,s is the same as the range of x s t (i.e., x s x s ), the clinician cannot extract any useful information from the decrypted c 5,s + c 6,s + (2γx s ) (t) − (γ)(t) (t). Note, that for every component of (13) 
In order to complete the classification, the server needs to compute (16) . Since d(t) is in the encrypted domain [i.e., (26) ], the server needs to obtain the sign of an encrypted number to complete this.
4) Obtaining the Sign of an Encrypted Value:
Let us denote two strings yes and no to represent the decision. Assume that if the sign of d(t) is positive, then the decision for the given patient data is yes and if the sign of d(t) is negative, then the decision for the given patient data is no. Since the server has the value of d(t) in the encrypted domain as in (26), we show in this section how to obtain the decision for the patient data in the encrypted domain. Let us assume that | d(t) |< 10 l , l ∈ Z in the plain domain. Note that since the training and test data samples are normalized, the value of l can be determined using the scale factor c 2 e c 3 used in (8) . Now, the server computes a new variable in the encrypted domain as
Since |d(t)| < 10 l , the most significant digit of z is either 1 (i.e., if d(t) > 0) or 0 (i.e., if d(t) > 0). Let us denote the most significant digit of z asz ∈ {1, 0}. Hence, the decision (Dec), can be obtained as
The most significant digitz could be computed using the following linear operation:
where subtraction sets the least significant digits of z to 0 while the multiplication shifts the most significant digit down. Since the z in (27) is in the encrypted domain the server needs to obtain thez in (29) in the encrypted domain. This can be performed as follows:
However the z available at the server is encrypted, thus similar to the process leading to the server being able to compute (26) where λ ∈ {0, 1} is used to avoid underflow (i.e., λ = 0 if z + r mod 10 l > r mod 10 l or λ = 1 if z + r mod 10 l < r mod 10 l ). The server knows z + r mod 10 l in the plain domain while the clinician knows r mod 10 l in the plain domain. Comparing two integers in encrypted domain has been widely studied in the literature [26] . Now, the server can compute [[z]] using (30) . The obtained [[z] ] can be used in (28) to obtain the decision for the patient data in the encrypted domain, as follows:
Now [[ Dec]] can be returned to the clinician who decrypts it to find the decision of the patient data (see Fig. 4 ).
C. Information Leakage
In the proposed algorithm, the private key resides at the clinician side; hence, it is not possible for the remote server which participates in this classification operation to decrypt the test sample or the classification result. However, the remote server interacts with the clinician when the homomorphic properties of Paillier cryptography are not sufficient to complete the task. During the interaction any encrypted values sent by the server could be decrypted by the clinician. . . , r n ] makes it infeasible for the clinician to extract any information about the normalization parameters fromt. Second, the server interacts with the clinician to exponentiate the encrypted value as described in Section III-B3, where the server adds a random value c 6,s in c 5,s + c 6,s + (2γx s ) (t) − (γ)(t) (t) and the range of c 5,s is the same as the range of (γx s ) (x s ). Note that for every support vector, c 6,s is generated freshly. Hence, this randomization makes it infeasible for the clinician to extract any server side parameters. However, this interaction reveals the number of support vectors used for classification. Since there is no relation between the size of the dataset and the number of support vectors used for classification, this leakage is not a breach to privacy of the dataset used in the training phase. Finally, the server interacts with the clinician for modulo reduction in order to obtain the sign of the decision function d(t) [see between (27) and (31)]. Since, d(t) is included in z in (27) , revealing z may leak the decision function value to the clinician. Hence, the server adds a random value r to z before sending it to the clinician. Again, this randomization makes it infeasible for the clinician to extract any server side information. Overall, our proposed method not only preserves the privacy of the patient information but also the server side classification parameters.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed encrypted-domain algorithm. We compare the accuracy of the proposed encrypted-domain method with the conventional plain-domain method. For the experiment, we consider two datasets from the UCI machine learning repository called the Wisconsin Breast Cancer (WBC) and Puma Indian Diabetic (PID) datasets [13] , [27] . The WBC dataset contains 681 samples where 444 samples are benign (noncancerous) and 237 samples are malignant (cancerous), while the PID dataset contains 768 samples where 500 samples are malignant and 268 samples are benign. The number of features for each sample in WBC and PID datasets are nine and eight, respectively (excluding class label attribute). Table II shows some examples of training samples after normalization from the WBC and PID datasets.
For evaluation, we used a leave-one-out approach [28] , that is, one sample is removed from the dataset and all the remaining samples are used for training the SVM. The removed sample will be used as patient data. This procedure will be repeated for a different left-out sample each time until all the samples are used. In order to analyze the proposed methods, we first conduct an experiment in the plain domain. Later, we do the same experiment in the encrypted domain for various scaling factors.
A. Experiments in the Plain Domain
In all experiments, we assume that the training data are not linearly separable and therefore we use the Gaussian kernel method as in (6) . Initially, we need to determine empirically an appropriate value for γ in (6). Hence, we have obtained Tables III  and IV for the WBC and PID datasets, respectively, in the plain domain using the method described in Section II. These tables show the classification accuracy for various γ values. Let us explain the sixth result column (i.e., γ = 10) in Table III . When γ = 10, the total number of correctly classified benign samples is 433 out of 444 (97.52%) and that of malignant samples is 229 out of 237 (90.72%). In total, 662 samples were correctly classified out of 681 (97.21%). Similarly, when γ = 15 for PID dataset as in Table IV , the total number of correctly classified benign samples is 482 out of 500 (96.40%) and that of malignant samples is 239 out of 268 (89.17%). In total 721 samples were correctly classified out of 768 (93.88%). Since γ = 10 for WBC dataset and γ = 15 for PID dataset provide higher accuracy than other values in this experiment, without loss of generality, we use γ = 10 for WBC dataset and γ = 15 for PID dataset for the experiments in the encrypted domain. We also noted that the average number of support vectors used for WBC and PID datasets are 205 and 535, respectively. 
B. Experiments in the Encrypted Domain
We have now evaluated our algorithm with 2048-bit key size. We tested our proposed privacy-preserving algorithm in a computer with 3.40 GHz processor and 8 GB of RAM running on Windows 64-bit operating system. The algorithm is written in C++ using GNU GMP library version 4.2.4. Both the server and clinician were modeled as different threads of a single program, which passes variables to each other.
As we mentioned in Section III-B, the scaling factors c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and c 5,s have influence on the classification accuracy in the encrypted domain due to the fact that the Paillier cryptosystem only encrypts integers. When we set c 1 = 1, c 2 = 1, c 3 = 0, and c 5,s = 0, the classification accuracy reduced to 0%, which shows the importance of the scaling factor in the encrypted domain.
Scalar c 1 is a linear scalar and has been used to scale the patient data in (20) . We noted that each element of the normalized training samples of the WBC and PID datasets are in the range of ±10 −4 (see Table II ); hence, we have chosen c 1 = 10 4 . Scalar c 2 is also a linear scalar and it has been used in (12) and (14) . In order to get six decimal-point accuracy, we have chosen c 2 = 10 6 in all the experiments. Scalar c 3 is an exponential scalar and used in (12) and (14) . The Paillier cryptosystem only encrypts integers in Z n ; hence, 0 < c 3 < log e (n). The scalar c 5,s must be chosen such that c 5,s + c 6,s < c 3 , where c 6,s is a masking factor in the range of x i x j ∀i, j. Next, we obtain a classification accuracy for different values of scaling factors. Table V shows the accuracies in the encrypted domain for different values of c 5,s when c 3 = 10. The scalar c 5,s can take any value between 0 and c 3 and is not necessarily an integer. For the WBC dataset, the classification accuracy in the encrypted domain is equal to the classification accuracy in the plain domain when 5 ≤ c 5,s ≤ 9 (i.e., γ = 10; see column in Table III) . Similarly, for the PID dataset, the classification accuracy in the encrypted domain is equal to the classification accuracy in the plain domain when 7 ≤ c 5,s ≤ 9 (i.e. γ = 15; see column in Table IV). However, the performance of the encrypted-domain algorithm deteriorates when c 5,s > 3 (c 5,s > 5) for WBC dataset (PID dataset) due to the quantization effect of the Paillier encryption. Hence, the decision function becomes independent of the patient data and provides infeasible results. Overall, the proposed method does not degrade the classification accuracy even 5 ,s when the classification is conducted in the encrypted domain for appropriate scaling factors.
C. Analysing the Factors Related to Accuracy
Equation (6) clearly shows that the classification function only depends on the number of support vectors (i.e., |S|) and the corresponding α s ∀s and b. Hence, after the training phase, the classification task becomes independent of the size of the dataset.
In The choice of c 1 depends on values in the test sample and support vectors. Table II shows that these values are in the range of ±10 −4 and that there was no significant improvement in the performance when we used more than four decimal points. Hence, the error is dependent on how many decimal points would be enough to get a good accuracy. Which means, if there is no significant increment in the performance then using more decimal points in values will not be useful. Since there is no significant improvement in the performance beyond four decimal points c 1 has chosen to be 10 4 . As shown in Section III-B3, e c 5 , s has been used to scale e c 6 , s −γ t t+2γ x s t . Hence, the classification error is dependent on the value e c 5 , s too. Table VI depicts the required c 5,s for various decimal value accuracy (i.e., e 2.3026 = 10 1 ). In our experiment, there is no improvement in performance beyond three decimal point accuracy for c 5,s (i.e., c 5,s > 6.9). Similarly, c 2 has been fixed to 10 6 . Overall, there will not be significant improvement in the accuracy even if we increase these scalars beyond the values mentioned earlier. However, from (6) and (8), it is obvious that the accumulated error of the decision function (i.e., d(t)) due to the wrong choice of c 1 (i.e., if c 1 = 10
2 ) is proportional to the number of support vectors × e dimension of data and the accumulated error in the decision function due to the wrong choice of c 2 and c 5,s being proportional to the number of support vectors.
D. Communication Complexity
The communication cost of the proposed algorithm depends highly on the size of Paillier cryptography; in our implementation the size of an encrypted sample is 2048 bits long. Sending an encrypted test sample with N number of features consumes 2.048N kbits of bandwidth in the communication channel. In the proposed algorithm, the server interacts with the clinician for three times. During the second interaction (i.e., for exponentiation) the server sends |S| number of encrypted values (i.e., equal to the total number of support vectors), while in the first and last interaction the server sends only one value. Hence, the communication cost for our algorithm is upperbounded by the second interaction which requires 2.048|S|kbits of bandwidth. Since the number of support vectors should be less than the size of the dataset, the worse case bandwidth requirement for both WBC and PID datasets are 0.174 and 0.197MB, respectively.
E. Computation Complexity
We measure the computation complexity in terms of the average runtime required for the proposed algorithm when the size of the security parameter N = 2048. The average time required for WBC and PID datasets are 41 and 92 s, respectively. It is noted that the average time is increasing linearly, with the number of support vectors used for the classification.
V. RELATED WORK
In general, data classification is a combination of two phases: training phase and testing phase. The first phase, training a classifier, requires a large collection of data. There are various organizations which publish their customers' data for research and monetary purposes. Publishing person-specific dataset (e.g., data related to patients of a cancer hospital) may reveal an individual's identity and breach the privacy of patients. However, there are various privacy preserving techniques (i.e., anonymization techniques and data perturbation techniques) have been well studied in the literature to preserve the privacy of individuals in the datasets (see [29] - [31] and references therein). However, the proposed study in this paper considers the privacy in the second phase of the data classification task, where clinicians only require to send the test data of their patient to the remote server where the classifier is already established. Since the proposed method preserves the privacy of the training dataset, it is possible for any organization with large data to provide a classification as a service to anybody through the Internet rather than anonymize and publish the dataset in a plain domain. Hence, our method is different from the data anonymization and data perturbation-based methods.
An SVM has been used in biomedical engineering to diagnose various diseases in the plain domain ( [9] - [11] and references therein). Note that, any algorithm in the plain domain cannot be used to provide decision support via the Internet due to the privacy issue. Recently, Mathew and Obradovic proposed a privacy preserving framework for clinical decision support using a decision tree-based machine learning technique [32] . The study in [32] supports the prevention of personally identifiable information leakage. However, the authors in [32] only considered the privacy of the training dataset by assuming that the training data is available from more than one location. In our study, we are not only preserving the privacy of the training dataset, but also the patient data and the result. Moreover, the algorithm developed for the decision tree cannot be directly extended to an SVM.
Let us review some of the privacy-preserving SVM algorithms developed in the data mining literature. The majority of studies in datamining were developed for the distributed setting [33] - [36] . More specifically, in [33] - [36] , the researchers assumed that different parties hold parts of the training datasets. Hence, they developed protocols to securely train a common classifier without each party needing to disclose its own training data to other parties. After the training, each party holds a part of the classification parameters and support vectors. In order to classify new data, each party has to be involved, equally, to compute a part of the kernel matrix, and then all parties together or the trusted third party will classify the new data. The works in [34] - [36] exploited the secure multiparty integer summation to cooperatively compute the kernel matrix. Basically, each party generates the Gramm matrix using scalar products of the training and new data samples. This Gramm matrix is later revealed to the trusted third party which will compute the kernel matrix and then classify the new data. Revealing the Gramm matrix may leak the private data and therefore privacy cannot be entirely preserved.
The study in [33] proposed, for the first time, a strong privacyenhanced protocol for a polynomial kernel-based SVM using cryptographic primitives; where the authors assumed that the training data are distributed. Hence, to preserve privacy, they developed a protocol to perform secure kernel sharing, prediction, and training using secret sharing and homomorphic encryption techniques. At the end of the training each party will hold a share of the secret. In the testing phase, all parties collaboratively perform the classification using their shared secrets. At the end of the protocol each party will hold a share of the predicted class label. Since the work is based on secret sharing, all the parties must be involved in every operation of calculating the kernel values and predicting the class. Hence, it is suitable only for the distributed scenario and not for the client-server model considered in this paper. In the client-server model, the client just sends the new data in the encrypted domain and is minimally involved in interactions with the server during the classification process. Moreover, the method developed in [33] considered only the polynomial kernel and so it cannot be modified directly to work with the Gaussian kernel-based SVM considered in this paper as these kernel functions are of different forms.
The recent study in [37] discusses the issue of releasing the trained SVM classifier without violating the privacy of support vectors. While the Gaussian kernel was considered, a Taylor series was exploited to approximate the infinite dimension of the Gaussian kernel into finite dimension subject to negligible performance loss. Since this works purely in the plain domain, it cannot be modified to the clinician-server scenario considered in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a privacy-preserving decision support system using a Gaussian kernel based SVM. Since the proposed algorithm is a potential application of emerging outsourcing techniques such as cloud computing technology, rich clinical datasets (or healthcare knowledge) available in remote locations could be used by any clinician via the Internet without compromising privacy, thereby enhancing the decisionmaking ability of healthcare professionals. We have exploited the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem within our algorithm, where the cryptosystem only encrypts integer values. Hence, we proposed a novel technique to scale the continuous variables involved in the process without compromising the performance and privacy. To validate the performance, we have evaluated our method on two medical datasets and the results showed that the accuracy is up to 97.21%. Importantly, the benefit of our encrypted-domain method is that patient data need not be revealed to the remote server as they can remain in encrypted form at all times, even during the diagnosis process.
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